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TITLE: MOROCCO HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995

                            MOROCCO


The Constitution of Morocco provides that the country shall be
governed by constitutional monarchy with a representative
Parliament and an independent judiciary.  However, the ultimate
authority rests with the King, who retains the discretion to
terminate the tenure of any minister and dissolve Parliament to
rule by decree.  The current Parliament was formed in 1993 by a
two-stage process:  the election of 222 deputies by direct
universal suffrage and selection of the remaining 111 deputies
by labor organizations and other constituency groups.
International observers found the direct elections to be
generally fair with some irregularities.  However, the second
stage was marred by credible reports of widespread manipulation
and fraud.  When three major political parties refused to
participate in the Government without a far-reaching shift in
power in favor of the Parliament, the King appointed a
government of technocrats who, with minor changes, remained in
office in 1994.

The security apparatus comprises several overlapping police and
paramilitary organizations.  The Direction de la Surveillance
du Territoire, Surete Nationale, and the judicial police are
departments of the Ministry of Interior and Information.  The
Gendarmerie Royale reports directly to the royal palace.
Security force abuses continued in 1994, especially in cases
involving perceived threats to state security.

Morocco's mixed economy is based on agriculture, fishing, light
industry, phosphate mining, tourism, and remittances from
overseas workers, with illegal cannabis production a
significant factor.  Since the early 1980's, the Government has
pursued an economic reform program that has contributed to
generally strong economic growth, low inflation, and low fiscal
and external deficits.  The Government has embarked on a
program of privatizing state-owned enterprises.

In 1994 the Government made substantial progress on several
human rights fronts.  The King granted amnesty to 424 political
prisoners; the Government began paying stipends to former
inmates who survived incarceration at the notorious Tazmamart
Prison; a 1934 law allowing the imprisonment of political
opponents was abrogated; incidents of press censorship
decreased; and the Deputy Ministry for Human Rights expanded
its operations and continued dialogs with local and
international human rights groups.

However, several basic human rights problems remained
unaddressed.  Credible reports indicate that security forces
frequently abused detainees and prisoners and caused the deaths
of three persons in custody; state agents responsible for past
and present human rights abuses were not held accountable by
the weak and malleable judiciary or even subject to public
investigation; many persons remain in prison for advocating
independence for the Western Sahara; many young girls remain
subject to exploitative domestic servitude; and the Government
failed to make significant reforms in the manipulation-prone
electoral system and continued to suspend the right to due
process and freedom of speech and association.

The ubiquitous nature of the Ministry of Interior and
Information means that virtually all allegations of
governmental human rights abuse involve its employees.  The
Ministry is responsible for authorizing associations and
political parties; the conduct of elections, including
cooperation with the United Nations in a referendum on the
status of the Western Sahara; the oversight of the private
press and publication of the official news agency releases; the
direction of most security forces; the appointment and training
of many local officials; the allocation of local and regional
budgets; and the oversight of university campuses.  Less
formally, the Ministry exerts substantial pressure on the
judicial system.  In February comments to Parliament,
reiterated in November, the Minister of Interior made clear
that Ministry employees will not be held to answer for
allegations of abuse brought by Parliament, other ministries,
or nongovernmental organizations (NGO's).

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
           Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Three deaths of persons in police custody may be reasonably
attributed to security force brutality.  On August 4, officers
of the Surete Nationale in Khouribga, 75 miles southeast of
Casablanca, arrested Siman Bouchta for selling produce without
a permit.  A few hours later, Bouchta was rushed to a hospital,
reportedly for treatment of profuse bleeding, and he died
shortly thereafter.  His family has refused to accept his body
without the performance of an autopsy.  Requests for further
information by nongovernmental human rights organizations have
elicited no response from Moroccan authorities.

According to witnesses, four police officers in Rabat beat
Zerzouri Younes about the head in front of his parents' home on
August 13.  He died of his injuries after 4 days of
hospitalization.  Younes had no known political affiliations.
He was described in a communique issued by the Moroccan
Organization for Human Rights (OMDH) as emotionally unstable.

The police arrested Brahim Belfaqir in the city of Sale on
November 6 after his involvement in a fistfight.  He died in
police custody the next day.  Authorities ruled the death a
suicide, alleging that Belfaqir had taken an overdose of
medication, but Belfaqir's family denied that he took any such
medication.  Belfaqir was not known to be politically active.
An OMDH appeal to the Ministry of Justice failed to prompt a
public investigation.  In November the Minister of Interior
responded to a question in Parliament, submitted in writing by
a parliamentarian 2 weeks earlier, about Belfaqir's death.  The
Minister reportedly expressed surprise at the news of the death
and promised an investigation.  His response drew laughter from
the parliamentarians.  He has made no further comments on the
case.

In a fourth case, Mohammed Belqaidi, a former student activist
in Fes, died on October 27, reportedly as a consequence of a
general physical deterioration after receiving physical abuse
perpetrated by guards while serving a prison term from 1988 to
1993.  Belqaidi reportedly served his sentence in solitary
confinement.

A court proceeding brought by the family of Mustapha Hamzaoui,
a political activist who died in jail in 1993 under suspicious
circumstances, was postponed several times in 1994 and,
according to human rights groups, is unlikely to go to trial.

OMDH published a report in January that alleged 17 deaths took
place from 1989 to 1993 under circumstances that strongly
suggest the use of torture.  The Government has not conducted a
public inquest into any of these cases.

     b.  Disappearance

There were no reports of new disappearances.  In September the
Minister-Delegate for Human Rights announced that his office
had begun a review of 50 to 60 alleged disappearances, some
dating back several years.  He added that approximately 30 of
the dossiers presented strong prima facie cases of
disappearance.  At year's end, his office had not released any
results of this review.

Human rights organizations have published higher estimates of
the number of persons who disappeared permanently after last
being seen in the custody of security forces.  Many of the
additional disappeared persons are Sahrawis, the natives of
Western Sahara, who publicly advocated independence for that
territory.  The Government has never directly acknowledged that
Sahrawis have disappeared--even though it released some 300
Sahrawis in 1991 after periods of detention ranging up to 15
years.  However, the King expressly excluded Sahrawi
nationalists from the prisoner amnesty program announced in
July, thus indirectly acknowledging that some of them remain
imprisoned.

Rashid Benhayoun, a resident of the Casablanca suburb of
Mohamadia, disappeared on March 19 under circumstances
implicating a powerful local figure with strong associations
with the police.  This figure should be a prime suspect but
seems to have successfully prevailed upon police contacts to
quash any investigation.  In response to a request from OMDH,
the Minister of Justice publicly agreed to investigate the
disappearance.  This rare public statement from the Minister
was greeted enthusiastically by local human rights groups.  At
year's end, the Minister had not announced any further action.

     c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
         Treatment or Punishment

Although Morocco ratified the United Nations' Convention
Against Torture in 1993, security forces continued to subject
detainees to abuse--including the use of torture in cases
involving state security.  Reliable sources report that
Ministry of Interior interogation methods in state security
cases were modified in 1992.  The guidelines proscribe the use
of methods likely to leave visible marks or permanent
disabilities.  Hence, the most common methods include sleep
deprivation, the chemical inducement of vomiting fits, and
beatings under immobilizing restraint.

A detainee alleging police abuse must sign an application for
medical examination, naming the officers involved, and submit
it to the court.  Very few detainees take this step.  In a case
where evidence of abuse is strong, reliable reports suggest
that the police typically offer to drop the underlying charges
in exchange for a detainee's agreement to drop the allegation
of abuse.

In June a military tribunal tried several persons for smuggling
guns to Muslim fundamentalists in Algeria.  At trial, the
defendants moved to exclude their confessions from evidence as
having been obtained by torture.  The trial court and an
appeals court denied the motion without a hearing, despite
strong circumstantial evidence of abuse.

In May the authorities arrested seven teachers for
participating in a rally advocating teaching the Berber
language in public schools.  All detainees alleged they were
mistreated in detention and several, according to press
accounts, bore physical marks attributable to abuse.  Three
defendants were convicted of posing a "threat to the sanctity
of the State," but the court did not rule on the allegation of
abuse.

In cases that do not involve state security, witnesses report
that individual police officers abuse detainees with impunity
on an ad hoc basis.

Harsh treatment continues after conviction, especially for
prisoners serving sentences for state security crimes.  Several
political prisoners released in the July amnesty reported that
they suffered years of abuse from their guards, including
random assaults, deprivation of sleep, and prohibition of
family visits.  Prison guards have reportedly suspended inmates
against walls as punishment for violating some prison rules.

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Prison conditions are harsh.  Eleven persons reportedly died in
a 6-month period in one Casablanca prison due either to
illnesses contracted from unhealthy conditions or lack of
medical care for preexisting conditions.  The Government,
citing budgetary restraints, has not substantially implemented
the reforms recommended by the Royal Consultative Council on
Human Rights (CCDH), an advisory body whose members are
handpicked by the King, regarding prison overcrowding, medical
care, and nutrition.  Prisoner hunger strikes, although fewer
in number in 1994, were common, especially among Islamist
prisoners.  In a display of openness, the Government granted
access by representatives of Amnesty International (AI) to its
prisons.

Legal provisions for due process have been revised extensively
in recent years, but the authorities frequently ignore them.
Although arrests usually take place in public, the police
sometimes refuse to identify themselves and do not always
obtain warrants.  The law requires that a detainee be brought
before a judge within 48 hours of arrest--extendable to 96
hours upon approval of the prosecutor--and informed of the
pending charges.  Incommunicado (garde-a-vue) detention is
limited to 48 hours, with a one-time 24-hour extension at the
prosecutor's discretion.

An accused person must be brought to trial within 2 months of
arrest, but prosecutors may order five additional extensions of
pretrial detention of 2 months each.  Detainees are denied
counsel during the initial period of detention when abuse is
most likely to take place.  Counsel is allowed only as of the
first cross-examination, but many cases are resolved without
cross examination.

Some members of the security forces, long accustomed to
indefinite precharge access to detainees, continue to resist
the new rules.  Lawyers are not always informed of the date of
detention and are thus unable to monitor compliance with the
garde-a-vue detention limits.  Although the trend towards
compliance with the rules continued in 1994, there were several
exceptions, especially in state security cases, the most
publicized of which involved the gun-running and Berber speech
cases (see Section 1.c.).

The law provides for a limited system of bail, but it is rarely
used.  Nevertheless, the courts sometimes release defendants on
their own recognizance.  The law does not provide for habeas
corpus or its equivalent.  Under a separate code of military
justice, military authorities may detain members of the
military without warrants or public trial.

In March the Minister-Delegate for Human Rights announced that
the Government had begun making payments of 5,000 dirhams
(about $550) per month to 28 former inmates who survived
incarceration at the notorious Tazmamart Prison.  He also
acknowledged that 30 other prisoners had died there.  In
November the Minister-Delegate announced that the Government
would issue death certificates to families of the deceased
prisoners.  All 58 former inmates had been sentenced, after
mass trials, as accomplices in attempts on the King's life in
1971 and 1972.  The typical member of the Tazmamart group was
convicted of passive involvement in the plots--those convicted
of active participation were executed--and sentenced to a
3-year prison term.  Notwithstanding those sentences, the
survivors each served 18 to 20 years in solitary confinement,
with a complete absence of sanitary facilities and medical
care.  The Government offered no information on the prisoners
to their families during their confinement, and even refused to
confirm the existence of the detainees.

The Government released the Tazmamart group without explanation
in 1991, on condition that they do not publicly discuss the
circumstances of their confinement.  The former inmates have
quietly sought redress with the assistance of Moroccan human
rights groups, particularly the Moroccan Association for Human
Rights (AMDH).  No government official has been accused of
misfeasance in connection with Tazmamart.  No public
investigation is underway nor is any known internal government
investigation.

In the June gun-running case (see Section 1.c), the authorities
placed several suspects in incommunicado detention.  They
surfaced in a Rabat jail weeks later, after charges were
brought.  At their trial, the defendants moved for dismissal of
the case for gross violation of the garde-a-vue detention
limits.  In contradiction to available evidence, the court
found that the fugitives had spent most of the time after their
disappearance--and before charges were brought--in flight from
the authorities.  It therefore ruled that the detention limits
were not exceeded.

The authorities held the defendants in the Berber language case
(see Section 1.c.) in garde-a-vue detention for more than 2
weeks.  Although the three convicted defendants received
reduced sentences on appeal and were released in the July
amnesty, the obvious violation of garde-a-vue limits was not
subject to court ruling.

By contrast, in investigating incidents of violent crime in
August, the authorities evidently observed the due process
rules.  The incidents included a shooting at a Marrakech hotel
which left two dead, and an attempted armored car holdup in
Casablanca.  In the aftermath of those events, police
discovered several weapons caches, and investigations in
foreign countries linked the suspects to terrorist groups
abroad.  Despite the national security implications of these
discoveries, no evidence of illegal detention or physical abuse
has surfaced.  In fact, one of the principal suspects, after
disparaging the judicial system in a court hearing, later
withdrew a request for foreign counsel, stating that he had
been treated fairly and represented professionally.

Abdessalem Yassine, leader of the banned Islamist organization
Justice and Charity, entered his fifth year of house arrest.
Aside from rare meetings with his lawyers and family members,
the authorities do not allow him to have visitors, nor have
they filed formal charges against him.  However, two members of
the CCDH publicly acknowledged the illegality of Yassine's
continued detention.  Neither the Ministry of Justice nor the
Deputy Ministry for Human Rights has initiated a review.

There are no known instances of government-imposed exile.  As
part of the 1994 amnesty, the Government indicated that any
citizen living abroad in self-imposed exile would be welcomed
to return after taking an oath that acknowledged the legitimacy
of the monarchy and the nation's claim to the Western Sahara.
Several Moroccans living in Holland have been repatriated in
this fashion, and in December the Government began to process
claims from Moroccans living in France as well.

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

In theory there is a single court system for all nonmilitary
matters, but family matters such as marriage, divorce, child
support and custody, and inheritance are adjudicated by judges
trained in Islamic law, or Shari'a.  Judges considering
criminal cases or cases in nonfamily areas of civil law are
generally trained in the French legal tradition.  All judges
appointed in recent years are alumni of the National Institute
for Judicial Studies (INEJ) where they undergo 2 years of study
heavily focused on human rights and the rule of law.

The law does not distinguish political and security cases from
common criminal cases.  In general, detainees are arraigned
before a court of first instance.  If the infraction is minor
and not contested, the judge may order the defendant released
or impose a light sentence.  If an investigation is required,
the judge may release defendants on their own recognizance.
Cases are often adjudicated on the basis of confessions
obtained during incommunicado detention.  Some of these
confessions, according to reliable sources, are obtained under
duress.

All Moroccan courts are susceptible to extrajudicial
pressures.  Salaries paid to judges are modest; cash payments
to unscrupulous judges are sometimes made in routine cases.  A
more subtle, but doubtless more profound, corruption derives
from the judiciary's relationship with the Ministry of
Interior.  The Ministry, through its network of local
officials, or caids, who serve in tandem with local elected
officials, interacts regularly with local judges.  Through this
interaction, the caids transmit both general procedures for
various types of cases and advice regarding particular cases as
needed to the judges.  Credible sources report that judges who
expect enhanced remuneration and career progression do not
stray far from that guidance.  Attorneys report that newly
appointed judges, notwithstanding their INEJ training, are even
more willing to profit from this arrangement than their
predecessors.

In serious state security cases, communications between the
Ministry of Interior and the court are more direct.  In the
gun-running case (see Section 1.c.), if the court had applied
the due process rules, the defendants may have been
acquitted--a result that might have encouraged local
Islamists.  To avoid that possibility, security officers were
given virtually unlimited access to the suspects while they
were in pretrial detention, and were able to extract
confessions.  The trial court cooperated in the Ministry's
effort by retroactively adjusting the date of arrest to comport
with the garde-a-vue detention limits--an adjustment that
allowed the confessions to be admitted into evidence.

In late 1993, the King appointed Idrissi Machichi as Minister
of Justice.  A legal scholar and teacher, Machichi has an
international reputation for integrity.  While there were no
fundamental changes in the legal system, Machichi has
instituted some significant reforms.  For example, judges in
drug trafficking cases are now assigned on the day of trial;
traffickers are thus unable to approach corrupt trial judges to
arrange a pretrial dismissal of charges.  Machichi's presence
in office is cited by virtually every part of the legal
community as hope that the judicial system will eventually
achieve the independence mandated by the Constitution.

Aside from external pressures, the court system is also subject
to resource constraints.  Consequently, criminal defendants
charged with less serious offenses often receive only cursory
hearings, with judges relying on police reports to render
decisions.  Although the Government provides an attorney at
public expense for serious crimes--i.e., when the offense has a
maximum sentence of over 5 years--these attorneys often provide
inadequate repesentation.

In July the Government took two important steps to address the
problem of political prisoners.  First, the Parliament
abrogated a 1935 decree which authorized the authorities to
detain any person regarded as a "threat to the sanctity of the
State."  Originally promulgated during the French Protectorate
to suppress nationalists, the decree had become the principal
legal basis for jailing political opponents.

Second, the King granted royal amnesty to 424 prisoners, all of
whom were convicted under the 1935 decree.  Of the freed
prisoners, CCDH determined that 11 were political prisoners and
413 were criminals motivated by political concerns.  Most of
the group of 413 persons were convicted of crimes of violence
or vandalism in mass trials following the 1984 civil
disturbances in Tetouan, Casablanca, and Fes, as well as the
1990 disturbances in Fes and Tangier.  However, several were
imprisoned for exercising free speech and may also be
considered political prisoners.  Many of the prisoners granted
amnesty had rejected government overtures for pardons in
previous years because any pardon, under applicable law, would
have been granted only after an admission of guilt.

The released prisoners included human rights activist Ahmed
Belaichi, imprisoned in 1992 for televised comments critical of
the armed forces, and Islamist leader M'barek Missouni,
imprisoned in 1991 for distributing Islamist tracts.  More than
100 of those released are Islamists.  The human rights
community uniformly praised the abrogation of the 1935 decree
and the amnesty as significant efforts to turn the page on a
dark era in Moroccan history.

OMDH estimates that some 110 non-Sahrawis remain in prison.  Of
these, some 60 are Islamists.  Estimates of the number of
persons imprisoned for advocating independence for the Western
Sahara vary from the Government's position that none are held
to the claims of some international NGO's that several hundred
remain.

     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
         Correspondence

The Constitution states that the home is inviolable and that
the police may not conduct a search without a warrant.  The law
stipulates that search warrants may be issued by a prosecutor
for good cause.  However, there continue to be reports of
illegal searches of the homes and offices of suspected
political activists.

Government security services monitor the activities of certain
persons and organizations, including their telephones and
mail.  Government informers also monitor activities on
university campuses.

Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

     a.  Freedom of Speech and Press

The Constitution provides for freedom of expression, but the
law and tradition prohibit criticism on three topics:  the
monarchy, the Government's claim to the Western Sahara, and the
sanctity of Islam.

In 1994 a court sentenced union leader Ahmed Mlakgatt to 2
years for questioning the fairness of the 1993 legislative
elections.  Five residents of the coastal town of Bouznika were
sentenced to 2 years for committing the same offense.  In other
cases, the courts sentenced three Berber activists from 1 to 2
years for displaying a banner calling for the teaching of
Berber language courses in schools (see Section 1.c.), and 14
members of the "Unemployed Graduate Students Association" were
sentenced from 1 to 2 years for demonstrating against high
unemployment.  The Government released Mlakgatt, the Bouznika
residents, and the Berber activists in a royal amnesty in
July.  The students were freed prior to the amnesty.

The Government significantly restricts press freedom, though
the limits are not clearly defined.  A 1958 decree gives the
Government the authority to register and license domestic
newspapers and journals.  It uses this licensing power to
prohibit the publication of materials deemed to cross the
threshold of tolerable dissent.  The authorities may seize
offending publications and suspend the publisher's license.
Article 55 of the Press Code empowers the Ministry of Interior
to censor newspapers directly by ordering them not publish
reports on specific issues.

In 1994 the Government closed the independent Arabic tabloid,
Asrar, without explanation.  The paper circumvented the closure
by reorganizing as a new periodical, Asda.  Security officials
prohibited the distribution of one issue of Nouvelles du Nord
because it contained an article critical of the human rights
situation in Tunisia.

The Government tolerates satirical and often stinging
editorials in the opposition parties' dailies.  Particularly
sharp editorials in 1994 charged a lack of political leadership
regarding the recognition of Israel and a perceived
capitulation to the West in opening a liaison office in Israel,
both areas in which policy has been orchestrated by the Royal
Palace.  On the other hand, the Government restricted press
coverage of the gun-smuggling case (see Section 1.c.).

The Government owns the only television station receivable
nationwide without a decoder or satellite dish antenna; it does
not impede reception of foreign broadcasts.  Satellite dishes
are available, at prices that decreased dramatically in 1994,
and make available a wide variety of foreign broadcasts.  The
sole private television station may be received in most urban
areas with the rental of an inexpensive decoder.  Northern
residents may receive broadcasts from Spain with standard
antennas.

A great number of foreign news publications are available,
particularly from Europe and the United States.  The Government
generally tolerates a broad spectrum of opinion in the foreign
press.  This was especially true in 1994 as the Government
hosted several international events, including the conference
on the General Agreeement on Tariffs and Trade and the Middle
East Economic Summit, which attracted hundreds of foreign
journalists.

Despite the trend in recent years towards noninterference with
the foreign press, the Government continued to prohibit the
distribution of publications containing articles regarded as
offensive.  For example, the authorities seized the March 23
and April 28 editions of the French weekly Jeune Afrique
because they contained articles respectively urging greater
government support for a Moroccan national accused of murder in
France, and reporting alleged contacts between the Polisario
Front (a group seeking independence for the Western Sahara) and
Algerian Islamists.  The authorities temporarily blocked the
distribution of the September 9 edition of the French daily Le
Monde because it contained an interview in which a Moroccan
Islamist questioned the King's status as a spiritual leader.
The edition was allowed full distribution a few days later.

Universities enjoy relative academic freedom.  The Ministry of
Interior controls the hiring of instructors, the curriculum in
the Faculty of Law, and the physical plant, including the
residences in all faculties.